Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. Campbell 1995, 2006 This publication is in copyright. Campbell The College of William and MaryĬambridge university press Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge cb2 2ru, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York Information on this title: © Donald E. Incentives MOTIVATION AND THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATIONĭonald E. His published research has appeared in leading journals such as Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, American Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Review of Economics Studies, and the Journal of Mathematical Economics. He is the author of Resource Allocation Mechanisms (Cambridge University Press, 1987) and Equity, Efficiency, and Social Choice (1992). He previously served as professor of economics at the University of Toronto from 1970 to 1990. Campbell is CSX Professor of Economics and Public Policy at The College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia, where he has taught since 1990. Boxed examples are used to highlight points of theory and are separated from the main text. The second edition offers new chapters on auctions, matching and assignment problems, and corporate governance. Of the seventy different topics and sections, only twelve require a knowledge of calculus. The theory and examples are presented rigorously but not in an overly “high tech” way. The analysis is conducted using specific worked examples, lucid general theory, and illustrations drawn from news stories. The book examines a broad range of market transactions, from auctions to labor markets to the entire economy. It investigates the performance of institutions, from voting schemes to kidney transplants, to see if they enhance general well-being.
The book examines the performance of agents hired to carry out specific tasks, from taxi drivers to CEOs. This is problematic because each individual acts to maximize his or her individual payoff, regardless of its implications for the welfare of others. Incentives work well when they result in a high level of individual welfare generally. INCENTIVES Second Edition This book examines the incentives at work in a wide range of institutions to see how and how well coordination is achieved by informing and motivating individual decision makers.
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